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Abstract:
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Using a one-shot sequential-move bribery game, this paper
investigates the role of ethnic heterogeneity on corruption. The interest
is premised on the high levels of corruption in Kenya coupled with the
rising ethnicization of politics. When ethnic identity is made salient,
when a potential bribe-giver and a third party are co-ethnic, the bribegiver
is significantly less likely to offer a bribe to a non-coethnic bribee.
Rather, a bribe-giver is more likely to offer a bribe to a co-ethnic bribee
when the third party is also co-ethnic. A possible explanation for this
behaviour is the bribe-giver's expectation of ingroup reciprocity from
both the bribee and the third party. A bribe-giver anticipates that a bribe
offered to a non-coethnic bribee might be more likely to be punished by
a co-ethnic third party than a bribe offered to another co-ethnic. Thiswould be consistent with the notion of ingroup reciprocity in the sense
that when a bribe is offered to a co- ethnic bribee, even though this hurts
the third party, the disutility experienced is somehow less than when the
bribe is offered to a non-coethnic bribee. In other words, even though
the third party is adversely affected in both instances, there is some
solace to be found in the fact that a fellow co-ethnic is benefitting from
the bribe as opposed to a non-coethnic. The anticipation by a bribe-giver
that the bribee makes a decision to accept or reject a bribe on the basis
of ethnic consideration is mistaken since the bribee's decision is purely
opportunistic. The bribee's decision is mainly based on the initial
endowment and bribe amounts. |